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In this work, we trace and analyze the emergence of the crisis in the Bulgarian banking system as well 
as the behavior of the central bank and other macroeconomic institutions. The average annual rate of 
growth in the net profits of the commercial banks for the period 2002-2008 amounted to 31.6%, which 
encouraged and accounted for the increase in credits. After 2008, the pendulum began to swing back 
as the difficulties in collecting loan repayments increased, the strain in financial balances tightened 
and assistance and support from the regulators were requested. The level of the financial and operat-
ing income was maintained primarily because of the high interest rates on the loans, but the structure 
of their distribution shifted substantially. Administrative costs and depreciation were nearly frozen up, 
and impairment and provisions grew at the expense of profit. This work shows that macroeconomic 
policies allowed the expansion of the lending boom and encouraged its irrational development. Poor 
operation and poor quality of the institutions not only allowed but also enabled direction of invest-
ments to financing of inefficient production structures. Underestimating the negative consequences 
shoring up a dysfunctional institutional environment is deemed a form of irrationality; however, not 
one of the immediate economic players acted to override the economic and political environment. 
The financial and economic crisis currently affecting the country has its roots in the deficiencies of the 
domestic macroeconomic policies, and therefore, the efforts toward overcoming these failures should 
be directed at improved domestic macroeconomic management.
Introduction
Until the introduction of the Currency Board Arrange-
ment, that took place in 1997, the banking system in 
Bulgaria had been gradually decapitalized (Figure 1), 
and the hyperinflationary processes in the early second 
half of the 90s had an especially dramatic impact on 
the assets of the commercial banks (CBs). Due to the 
hyperinflationary wave, the depreciation of money ag-
gregates, had wiped out the country’s ability to finance 
its own economic development. A telling example is 
the repeated contraction of the CBs’ assets, - in terms 
of USD estimates; in 1993, the CB assets were evalu-
ated at USD 24.8 billion, whereas four years later, they 
stood at USD 4 billion. 
After the adoption of the CBA, a process of long and 
painful recovery and capitalization of the banking sys-
tem began.
The objective of this article is to determine the fol-
lowing: (1) how the banking system and banking in-
termediation in the country developed over the last 
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ten years or so; (2) the reasons for and factors involved 
in the witnessed development; (3) the regulatory mea-
sures and assessment of their efficiency, and (4) the 
possibilityof financial and banking sustainability given 
that economic activities have remained unsteady.
As a rule, determination of the facts, arguments and 
estimates occurs in parallel. The data used in this inves-
tigation were publicly available from the official sourc-
es of macroeconomic institutions such as the Bulgar-
ian National Bank (BNB) and the Ministry of Finance, 
although not all of their policies at the macroeconomic 
level may have been made public officially. The meth-
odology applied is based on logic and the principles 
of market relationships in attempting to assess, charac-
terize and combine all possible regulatory influences. 
The goal was to work out all possible and necessary as-
sessments in parallel with their influences, which were 
considered both as independent management policies 
with their effects and as a complex scheme. A number 
of econometric dependencies revealed unsatisfactory 
estimates from the point of view of economic logic, 
and these were not addressed in this work. The current 
article does not analyze the reasons for the unsatisfac-
tory econometric estimates, especially under consid-
eration of banking interactions, which were discussed 
by other authors (Kazi & Leonard, 2011). Instead, the 
emphasis is placed on establishing the interactions (in 
principle) of the relationship management in terms 
of outcomes and explanations. The analysis is aimed 
at assessing the financial and banking sustainability in 
the context of the overall economic environment.
The article is organized as follows: The major ele-
ments of the commercial banking policies are analyzed 
in the first five parts, together with reflection on the 
regulatory measures applied. The next part contains an 
attempt at systematizing the policy lessons, and the fi-
nal part presents the conclusions and synthesis. 
Resource provision and lending 
policies
Immediately following the 1996-1997, years of crisis, 
the CBs were exceptionally careful and restrained in 
formulating their lending policies. Confidence be-
tween lenders and debtors was at a notably low level. 
Because the CBs were reluctant to lend, their financial 
resources were not used to the fullest. During this peri-
od, the CBs preferred to export their resources and re-
tain them as deposits with first-class foreign CBs (Fig-
ure 2). Therefore, only a quarter of the CBs’ assets were 
realized as loans (Figure 4). Lending grew over time, 
however, and by 2005, it accounted for approxmately 
60% of assets. Koetter & Wedow (2010) proved that 
under the given circumstances, expanding the amount 
of bank credit has no significant effect on growth and 
that the quality of banking is more important. During 
the same year, the BNB undertook selected regulatory 
measures to cool the rate of lending: regulations were 
aimed at the operation of thecommercial banks’ re-
serves held with the BNB. The lending market reacted 
positively to the regulatory measures, and the share of 
the loans in the CBs’ assets fell gradually to near 52%. 
This share was close to the average for the EU member 
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countries and was estimated as relatively stable; the 
CBs’ loan portfolio was diversified sufficiently against 
the credit risk (BNB, 2005).
Privatization of the CBs was completed in the 
early 21st century. The new owners of the resident 
Bulgarian CBs envisioned positive prospects for 
development of the Bulgarian lending market and 
therefore, increased their activity. The results, in 
terms of the CBs’ net profit, were impressive (Figure 
3); the average growth rate of the CBs’ net profit for 
the 2002-2008 period amounted to 31.6%, given an 
average annual rate of growth in the GDP of 6.1%! 
The gradual reduction in corporate tax, from 35% 
(2000) to 10% (2008), made a significant contribu-
tion to this intensive dynamics as well. The flat rate 
in Bulgaria has remained at the lowest level in the 
EU, but the future harmonization of the tax system 
within the EC is considered unavoidable (Wołowiec 
& Soboń, 2011). The growth in the CBs’ net profit 
provided a foundation and accounted for the unbal-
anced drive towards making the most of the oppor-
tunities for increasing lending. 
The foreign owners of the resident CBs supported 
this lending. The deposits of non-residents, held with 
the resident CBs, rose gradually (Figure 2). These de-
posits represented foreign financial resources (most 
likely that of the owners) provided to the resident CBs 
to raise their potential for intensified lending. With 
the country’s accession to the EU, this process became 
particularly active. The process of foreign capital pen-
etration in the newly accessed member-countries of 
the EU is a typical feature of the period under con-
sideration and has been noted in specialist literature 
(Krugman, 2008; Wilczyński, 2011). The highest in-
flow of foreign deposits into the resident CBs was 
reached in November 2008 (greater than 27% of GDP), 
after which the trend broke. By 2011, Bulgaria occu-
pied a position somewhere in the middle among the 
Eastern European countries in terms of financing the 
resident CBs via foreign CBs, as observed by BIS-Basle 
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012). As a mat-
ter of fact, these financial resources fed the overheat-
ing economy and were unsterilized (or only partly so). 
For 2007-2008, the overall growth of deposits in the 
banking system was estimated at approximately BGN 
20 billion, and 60% оf this total represented growth in 
the deposits of non-residents. 
By 2008, the share of the loans to non-financial cor-
porations, households and non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISHs) in the CBs’ assets had exceeded 
70% and continued torise. The BNB estimated that the 
share of the “Loans and Advances” indicator in the CBs’ 
assets in 2009-2011 accounted for over 80% (BNB, 2011). 
Such an uncalculated and unwise emphasis on lending 
provided by the CBs no doubt incurred risks warranted 
great attention. The diversification of the CBs’ portfolio 
with a view toward mastering the credit risk receded in 
the background in the face of the possibility for profit ac-
cumulation. The lending race was in full swing.
 After 2008, the problem that the resident CBs faced 
was one of how to contain the pressure for impairment 
of the loans that had been issued. The CBs’ assets con-
tinued to rise significantly due to inertia rather than 
as the outcome of an awareness of a positive return. 
At this point, the growth of deposits in the banking 
sector (such growth actually occurred; for 2009-2011, 
deposits with the CBs grew by nearly BGN 6 billion, 
given that non-residents’ deposits fell by BGN 5.7 bil-
lion) was enabled by the higher level of domestic sav-
ings. Consequently, a process of gradual contraction 
of lending activities began. The non-resident deposi-
tors began to withdraw, which might be attributed to 
the feeling of insecurity in domestic macroeconomic 
management rather than international conjuncture. 
The corporate tax in Bulgaria is the lowest in the EU, 
and investors are charged higher tax rates in any other 
European country. Nevertheless, investments grew 
gradually, but the growth rate continued to shrink. 
This development was assisted by the resident CBs as 
well, which began to export financial resources more 
actively to retain them with the foreign CBs.
Foreign capital is particularly sensitive to the ele-
ments of domestic macroeconomic management. An 
additional funding risk arose from the origin of this 
capital, especially from difficulties in the banking sys-
tems of the home countries. This was the situation in 
Bulgaria, especially due to the predominance of the 
Greek banking capital. The inflow of foreign capitalvia 
deposits should be evaluated with close attention and 
controlled with the construction of respective buffers. 
A lack of possibilities for sterilizing the money supply 
due to the CBA in operation should raise an alert by 
the regulatory authority, which did not prove suffi-
ciently alert under the conditions of Bulgaria. Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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The credit risk linked with the sectoral structure of 
credits remained unappreciated as well. Granting cred-
its to sectors such as „Real estate, renting and business 
activities”, and „Construction” and „Transport, storage 
and communications” became more prevalent (Figure 
5). However, lending to the production sector lagged 
behind. The sectors of „Manufacturing”, „Mining and 
quarrying”, „Electricity, gas and water supply”, and „Ag-
riculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” barely account-
ed for 16.5% of the overall credits in 2008 (4.7 percent-
age points less compared with 2005), and 37.4% were 
directed to „Households and NPISHs”. The major por-
tion of the credits went to construction and the service 
sector (46.1% in 2008, 5.7 percentage points greater 
than three years ago). Such a sectoral lending structure 
was typical of the EU and not only of the EU. In fact, 
the mania for investing in real estate, renting and busi-
ness activities seemed universal (DG Enterprise and 
Industry, 2012; European Commission, 2011). The 
prevailing public opinion was that real estate prices 
would never collapse (Roubini & Mihm, 2010). This 
sector composition of credits cannot be deemed sus-
tainable or promising for the future.
The development described was the outcome of 
the euphoria for profit that caused the banking circles 
to become carried away. Prices for real estate shot up 
with positive expectations, the flow of foreign financial 
resources continued and the lending race proceeded 
in full swing. In retrospect, sobering and slow-down 
should not have taken long to arrive.
Regulation of the lending sector composition lies 
outside the authority of the BNB. This type of activ-
ity requires and presumes a much better coordination 
between the BNB and the government. It is a public 
secret that real estate transactions during this period 
were officially effected at artificially low prices (rough-
ly ten times lower than the real price paid), which en-
couraged profiteering in real estate. Control of licenses 
for new construction was a formality that enabled ac-
celerated investment on a large scale, and construction 
sites were quickly designed without care for the future, 
using easy money. All these activities became possible 
because the various institutions functioned poorly.
In parallel with this process, the formal grounds 
for charges of illegal (criminal) deeds were eliminated 
because the huge amount of real estate acquired was 
officially accounted at unnaturally low prices. For 
experienced defenders of the law, it is not difficult to 
find a seemingly satisfactory explanation of how large 
buildings were acquired at artificially lower official 
prices and thus escape legal prosecution. 
The government is the authority that should install 
order in this type of speculation. If the government 
had not allowed cheating in the sales and trading pric-
es of real estate, then the incentives for profiteering in 
this field would have been eliminated. 
Sobering
Roubini & Mihm (2010) found that banking security 
is transient and erratic. After 2008, the banking pen-
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dulum swung back towards center. Difficulties were 
more frequently encountered in collecting the credits 
granted, the tension in financial balances increased 
and aid and support were solicited from the regulatory 
authorities. Lending activities gradually died down, 
and nominal annual average rate of growth in lending 
approached 2% while the real rate was almost zero. 
The significantly deteriorated financial results of 
the commercial banking industry are illustrated by the 
dynamics of return on equity (coefficient ROE, Figure 
3). Until 2008, the ROE remained at a relatively steady 
level of over 20%, but in the following years, it fell 
sharply. The coefficient dynamics reflects the depth of 
the financial crisis of the CBs. The race for dominance 
in the credit market over the previous years, which was 
insufficiently sanctioned by the BNB, had turned the 
economic picture upside down and, theoretically, it 
should have been expected.
The events at the end of 2008 had an influence on 
concern in the BNB sector over the soundness of the 
commercial banks, as reflected in the growth of the CB 
equity (Figure 6). Immediately after in the following 
year, the total CB equity grew by almost a fifth (given 
an asset growth of 1.9%), allocated primarily to „...the 
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BNB’s recommendations for banks to maintain higher 
primary capital minima and capitalise profits to boost 
surplus capital” (BNB, 2010). Equity grew both be-
cause of the increase in issued capital and the growth 
in reserves. 
Still, it should be noted that a fourth of the overall 
growth of CB equity in 2009 was an outcome of the 
increase in the capital of the only state-owned bank in 
the country, the Bulgarian Development Bank (BDB). 
At the end of 2008, the government made the decision 
to raise the capital of BDB by BGN 500 million (with 
funds from the fiscal reserve account) as an anti-crisis 
policy measure. Therefore, the BDB capital rose from 
BGN 55 million at the end of 2007 to BGN 622 million 
at the end of 2009. 
The capital adequacy of the Bulgarian banking sys-
tem is 12% (higher than the internationally accepted 
standard), and the reported values are 2-3 percentage 
points higher. For this reason, the Bulgarian bank-
ing system does not register the usual problems with 
capital adequacy. It is worth noting, however, that the 
prevailing growth in equity in the banking sector has 
resulted from informal regulatory measures carried 
out by the BNB. This situation implies that a great op-
portunity exists for exerting influence on the behavior 
of CBs by the central regulator. Therefore, this fact in-
creases the responsibility of the BNB for the uncon-
trolled and uncalculated lending boom during 2007-
2008, above all.
Over the following two years, capital retained the 
values already reached, and its symbolic growth was 
overwhelmingly due to the contribution of the higher 
reserves, i.e.no repatriation of profit. 
One view of the difficulties experienced by the CBs 
in their lending policies can be obtained from the 
dynamics of the applied provisions (Figure 7). In the 
beginning of the new century, problems existed with 
the inherited credits that had been so easily granted, 
and thus the relative level of the provisions enacted 
was sufficiently high - at a low absolute level of cred-
its. Over time, bad debts were written off and the 
proces returned to normal. After the privatization of 
the CBs was completed, more intensive lending poli-
cies were initiated, but the relative level of provisions 
decreased because of sound banking. This situation 
continued until the end of 2008 when the CBs began 
experiencing liquidity difficulties. In early 2009, the 
BNB substantially alleviated the terms for classifying 
the risk exposures of CBs, but the provisions continued 
to grow at faster rates. This observation suggests that 
the BNB must have been aware of the likely difficul-
ties of the CBs in ensuring that credits were serviced, 
and accordingly, it decided in advance to double the 
length of the terms for classification of risk exposures. 
In this context, the question we face is why the BNB 
had allowed the exceptionally high lending activities in 
2007-2008 given that it later revealed a perfect under-
standing of the situation that was created?
Liquidity problems
The issue of CB liquidity seems ambiguous. The liquid-
ity ratios as a function of the maturity time bands do 
not correspond to the requirements and recommenda-
tions of the BNB Ordinance No. 11 on bank liquidity 
management and supervision. It is true, however, that 
these coefficients improved later in time (Figure 8), 
i.е., the CBs’ liquidity improved. Almost a year later, all 
maturity time bands recorded a significant improve-
ment in the liquidity coefficients for the first and sec-
ond group of CBs, but the third group (seven branches 
of foreign CBs) experienced an even worse situation. 
However, the responsibility for their liquidity condi-
tion was to be borne by their foreign head offices.
Indirect indicators (at least four) show that the CBs 
suffered from liquidity problems after 2008, which re-
flected on their lending policies. 
First, we cover the approach to maintaining the 
minimum required reserves (MRR) of the CBs with 
the BNB. 
According to BNB Ordinance No. 21 in effect on 
the MRR maintained by banks with the BNB, the CBs 
are entitled to avail themselves (without restrictions) of 
the balances on their accounts with the BNB, where the 
MRR are accounted for, provided that the CBs comply 
with the aggregate monthly requirement. In the case in 
which the CBs make use of over 50% of the BGN equiv-
alent of the MRR required, they must pay interest to the 
BNB on the BGN exceeding 50% for each day of use.
Figure 9 reveals the level of MRR of CBs held by 
the BNB by weeks. The fluctuations in the trend cor-
respond to the regulations enacted by the BNB with 
respect to a change in the absolute size of the MRR. 
The most interesting features are the fluctuations of the 
reserves by week in the period after 2008.102 Garabed Minassian
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Until the beginning of 2009, the weekly fluctuations 
observed might be considered normal. Later, however, 
a certain regularity of fluctuations with expanding am-
plitude was outlined. By the end of each month, the CBs 
deposited the funds needed to ensure that the required 
aggregate monthly size of MRR was available, and this 
moment corresponds to the peaks observed in Figure 9. 
Immediately afterwards, the CBs would withdraw up to 
a fourth ormore from the MRR. By 2012, this amplitude 
had clearly shrunk but has remained quite large. 
A logical explanation for the process observed is 
that the CBs need liquidity, and thus they resort to us-
ing their own reserves maintained with the BNB.
Second, we address the CBs’ interest policy.
An indirect indicator for the liquidity problems ex-
perienced by the CBs is the dynamics of interest rates 
on time deposits (Figure 10). 
A steady growth was observed in the interest rates 
on deposits of an agreed maturity (time deposits) 
throughout 2008. The average annual inflation rate 
(CPI) for 2008 was 12.3% (Table 1) and could account 
for the rise in interest rates, but during the following 
year, the picture became somewhat different. In 2009, 
the CBs were ready to offer a real interest rate on de-
posits of agreed maturity of over 4%. For the same year, 
the average yield-to-maturity of the global bonds in 
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EUR, issued by Bulgaria (issue 2002 and maturity in 
2013) was 5.8%, i.е., it was more profitable for investors 
to maintain deposits with the Bulgarian resident CBs 
for a guaranteed income without risk than to invest in 
risky global bonds. 
A similar situation occurred in the following two 
years. In the first half of 2011, the real interest rates on 
time deposits became zero, but the process of recovery 
of the real interest rates was subsequently renewed.
The CBs have their own reasons for incurring such 
costs, and the explanation can only lie in the lack of 
sufficient liquidity. The CBs pay a high price to attract 
new deposits and compete amongst each other be-
cause they need fresh financial resources. At the same 
time, interest rates on the interbank money market fell 
to symbolic levels (e.g., an annual rate of approximate-
ly0.2%), but what was provided consisted of almost 
exclusively overnight deposits. The CBs demonstrated 
a need for long-term liquidity. Deposits up to BGN 100 
thousand are officially guaranteed and thus there were 
no demands waiting for the withdrawal of financial 
resources, i.e., there was no fear of loss in the case of 
probable insolvency and a need for overnight liquidity. 
Third, we examine the composition of the CBs’ assets.
In Figure 4, we can trace the change in the share of 
the CBs’ loans via their assets (the data are given for the 
entire banking system). This information was present-
ed in the official analytical materials of the BNB (BNB, 
2012). By the end of 2011, the CBs’ loans and advances 
constituted almost four-fifths (78.6%) of the CBs’ as-
36 
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Table 1. Comparative Return (average annual data)* (percent)
Interest on Deposits with 
Agreed Maturity (new business)
BGN Inflation (CPI) 
Yield to maturity of the 10-year 
global LTGS in EUR
2008 5.4 12.3 6.1
2009 7.0 2.8 5.8
2010 6.8 2.4 3.6
2011 5.2 4.2 3.3
Notes:
* The information is from 2008, because data from the previous years are methodologically inconsistent.104 Garabed Minassian
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sets: a tenth (9.9%) represented money and money bal-
ances with the central bank, the investment portfolio 
accounted for less than a tenth (8.2%) оf the assets and 
the remainder (3.3%) included other assets. Given this 
composition of assets, it is far-fetched to claim that suf-
ficient liquidity existed. The CBs’ resources were fully 
engaged. Sufficient (plentiful) liquidity was available in 
the beginning of the century when the CBs’ loans ac-
counted for nearly a quarter of the assets. 
If CBs had maintained sufficient liquidity (primarily 
through containing of lending), then the reasons obvi-
ously could be found in the predection of difficulties in 
collecting the established loans, either in the present or 
in the future, and not in the judgment of a lack of cur-
rent projects worth crediting. Тhis conclusion forces 
us to look back to the years in which lending remained 
out of control. 
„We should look for the prerequisites for growth rath-
er than the prerequisites for crisis” is a statement made 
by Mises (2006). The consequences from resorting to 
regulation (or the lack of regulation), if the situation 
were not properly assessed in time, would reflect by 
undesirable developments. 
Fourth, we illustrate the sharp deterioration in the 
final financial results of CBs.
When evaluating the lending policies of CBs after 
2008, we should keep in mind the sharp deterioration 
of their final financial results (Figure 3) as well as the 
natural and logical search for and use of all possible 
means and instruments for a positive upturn. In 2011, 
the CBs committed almost a third more equity than 
in 2008, whereas the net profit for the same period 
was 58% lower. Shareholders would not have tolerated 
a management that showed timidity, insecurity and 
passivity in managing the CBs, and even more so with 
sufficient liquidity available. The excuse of „no projects 
of good quality available” would simply not hold true 
under a market environment in which equilibrium is 
always achieved in striving for optimization from both 
sides and a full commitment of all resources available.
The abovementioned considerations and arguments 
show that the CBs continued to experience certain li-
quidity difficulties, which were eventually reflected in 
their credit passivity, and respectively in the shrinking 
of investments in the economy. 
The problem with liquidity in economics has certain 
ambiguous dimensions. 
Table 2 shows the aggregate results of GS auctions 
that took place in the recent years. Interest was quite 
high in these auctions and rose even after 2008. Until 
2008, these events included the government budget 
which realized surpluses and did not need to attract 
additional financial resources, and therefore the quan-
tities of Government Securities (GS) offered on the 
money market were minimal. The situation changed 
after 2008, when the demand for financial resources 
on behalf of the Ministry of Finance rose significantly 
and the demand for GS from local investors rose even 
faster. The high values of the cover coefficients of the 
issues implied a high liquidity available in the country 
(not with the CBs), which was ripe for realization.
In the primary GS market for the period under con-
sideration, the non-banking institutions, i.e. insurance 
companies, pension funds, non-banking financial in-
Table 2. Government Security Auctions (million BGN)
Nominal Value of the Offer
Nominal Value of the Bids 
Approved
Bid-to-cover Ratio
2008 340 874 2.6
2009 545 1097 2.0
2010 948 3136 3.3
2011 995 2328 2.3Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Table 3. Holders of Government Securities (percent)
Table 4. Financial Account of the Balance of Payments (million EUR)
Banks Others*
2008 61.3 30.9
2009 58.9 38.7
2010 55.6 41.1
2011 53.6 44.4
Yr Assets Liabilities Total
2008 -670 12177 11463
2009 -1187 2369 1163
2010 -783 109 -699
2011 -971 -158 -1194
Notes:
* Insurance companies, pension funds, non-banking financial institutions, companies, individuals;
stitutions, companies and individuals, became much 
more active (Table 3). For the sake of thoroughness, 
we should add foreign investors as holders as well, but 
their participation was limited to one percent of the 
overall quantity of GS issued on the internal money 
market). These products were legal entities that ac-
cumulated free financial resources and were searching 
for opportunities for investment with a view towards 
rational management of the money funds and provi-
sion for a return. The preferences included to investing 
in GS because these products enjoyed higher security 
and a much longer maturity, which was of considerable 
importance as well. The one-year GS, issued in 2010, 
accounted for a tenth of the overall issue of GS, and 
more than half had a 10-year maturity. At the same 
time, the predominant promotion of CBs was for de-
posits of 3-6 month maturity, which obviously differed 
from what investors sought. 
In addition, the cross-border flow of financial re-
sources from residents included in the financial ac-
count of the balance of payments (Table 4) was also 
predominantly sourced from non-banking investors.
The information quoted implies that the various in-
stitutional funds in the country enjoyed liquidity that 
remained underused. Simultaneously, the CBs showed 
signs of liquidity difficulties. The two sides did not 
meet, mostly due to structural imbalances. Institu-
tional investors were interested in long-term lucrative 
investments, whereas the CBs would have rather at-
tracted short-term funds with the expectation of low-
ering their interest rates costs and receiving improved 
return on the loans made. 106 Garabed Minassian
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Currency hedging
The CBs adopt a certain strategy in determining the 
foreign exchange composition of their own assets 
and liabilities as a type of anti-crisis safety measure. 
The CBs management is able to manage the currency 
composition of its assets and liabilities in accordance 
with its own estimates, expectations and preferences. 
The management of currency composition is carried 
out by pursuing a specific interest rate policy for each 
individual currency component. 
Table 5 illustrates the currency composition of the funds 
attracted by the CBs (by the end of the year), and Table 6 
displays the currency composition of the loans granted 
from the resident CBs in the country. (In Table 6, the sum 
by years is less than 100% because there is one additional 
component that is not presented, namely „Impairment”). 
Table 5 shows that a shift in the CBs’ behavior was 
recorded in 2009 with respect to the currency compo-
sition of the financial resources attracted. Until 2009, 
the share of the BGN- attracted resources progres-
sively diminished at the expense of the EUR-attracted 
resources. Over the following two years, however, 
a sharp change occurred, and the CBs began to look 
more intensely for liabilities in BGN, also expressed by 
the higher interest on time deposits offered in BGN. 
The changes in the currency composition of the 
loans followed a strict logic of contraction of the BGL-
loan share at the expense of the EUR-loan share. 
Table 5. Currency Composition of the Funds Attracted by CBs (percent)
Table 6. Currency Composition of the Loans (percent)
Yr BGN EUR Other
2007 41.2 51.9 6.9
2008 39.8 53.9 6.3
2009 35.4 58.7 5.8
2010 41.3 52.0 6.7
2011 45.2 48.0 6.8
Yr BGN EUR Other
2007 43.7  51.5  4.8 
2008 40.0  56.1  3.9 
2009 38.5  57.9  3.6 
2010 38.0  58.3  3.8 
2011 33.9  61.2  4.8 Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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This change coincided with fading hopes for a quick 
accession to the Euro area.
There are no chance phenomena with bankers; as 
a rule, their behaviors are well-thought out and calcu-
lated. Therefore, the question that remains is why did 
the model of banking behavior change? 
The party that gains under a substantial deprecia-
tion (devaluation, crisis) of the local currency is the 
borrower, and the party that loses is the lender. If the 
local currency (the Bulgarian lev) crashed, the bank-
ers who had granted BGL-loans would have lost. As 
a consequence, the depositors that maintained BGN 
deposits would have also lost. 
The process described is highly inertial (structural sta-
tistics are determined by balances, not by new business), 
and thus inconsistent fluctuations are unlikely. The CBs 
would rather offer higher interest on deposits in BGN 
(compared with deposits in EUR), i.е., charge themselves 
with higher current interest costs because they suspect 
a possibility for collapse of the Bulgarian lev in future. By 
analogy, they would rather grant additional EUR-loans at 
lower interest rates because they have greater faith in the 
stability of the EUR. Managing the currency positions of 
the CBs contributes to hedging the currency risk in ac-
cordance with the prevailing expectations.
Regardless of the strains and debt perturbations 
present in the Euro area, the participation of other cur-
rencies (in additions to the BGN and EUR) in the CB 
structures of assets and liabilities is relatively minimal 
and steady. Bankers do not foresee serious changes in 
the European currency configuration. 
The behavioral model of bankers represents a pe-
culiar vote on and assessment of the nature of mac-
roeconomic management and is a form by which the 
domestic (hidden) bankers provide a credit rating for 
a specific macroeconomic policy. It seems that bank-
ers were not inclined to voting much confidence in the 
present macroeconomic management.
 Income and Expenses Composition
The crisis of 2008 revealed many problems connected 
with the assessment and adoption of various types of 
risks in commercial banking. One of these problems 
is the way in which the remuneration of employees in 
the banking sector was worked out (Attali, 2008). It is 
logical for remunerations to follow the dynamics of the 
final financial results from the banking operations, but 
global experience has shown that this is not always so, 
especially with CBs of dubious success.
Figure 11 shows the development of the CBs’ ad-
ministration costs in Bulgaria for the period 2004-
2012. The elements of the CBs’ income statement 
encompass two elements: (1) Staff expenses and (2) 
General and administrative expenses. The structure of 
the indicator is relatively steady over time with small 
variations, e.g., two-fifths (or slightly more) of the ad-
ministration costs account for staff expenses and the 
general and administrative expenses make up the rest. 
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The trend of the indicators until 2008 seems quite 
sharp. For correct evaluation, this trendshould be jux-
taposed with an analogical trend, e.g., the rise in labor 
pay in the country. The National Statistical Institute 
recorded that the average annual salary of those em-
ployed on labor contracts in the country for 2003 was 
BGN 3280. This number grew to BGN 6538 in 2008, 
i.е., when the average annual rate of growth for the pe-
riod was 14.8%. At the same time, for the same period, 
the average annual rate of growth in administrative 
costs of CBs was 18.2%. 
The gross pay of bankers’ labor outstripped the av-
erage labor pay in the country but not by much, i.е., 
there are no grounds to claim that bankers abused the 
possibility of raising their income. The level of pay in 
the country was rather low compared with European 
standards, and it is therefore natural to record relative-
ly higher rates of growth under these circumstances.
The internal structure of pay by individual labor cat-
egories in the banking system is no doubt essential, but 
this information remains confidential. The narrow cir-
cle of top management of the CBs enjoyed an income 
several times higher than that of the average employee, 
but this is the usual practice.
After uncovering situations of misuse of bonuses 
paid out to the managerial elite of certain CBs in the 
world, the regulator BNB reacted. For the first time in 
its operation, the BNB adopted a special Ordinance 
No. 4 (of 21st of December 2010, available on the Inter-
net) on the requirements for remunerations in banks. 
Ordinance No. 4 is a type of guarantee that no such 
misappropriation of the attracted funds by the CBs will 
be allowed.
The rise in the CBs’ administration costs after 2008 
was suppressed (Figure 11). Тhis process occurred 
in harmony with the poor financial indicators of the 
CBs. The average annual rate of growth in the average 
annual pay of those employed on labor contracts in 
the country in 2011 relative to that in 2008 was 8.6%, 
whereas for the same period, the CBs’ administration 
costs rose (at an average annual basis) ten times more 
slowly, namely, a rate of 0.8%. In accordance with the 
official statistics, the average annual pay in the „Fi-
nancial and Insurance Activities” sector exceeded the 
average for the country by 2.23 times in 2008, and 
two years later by 2.08 times. Banking management 
showed prudence in determining the remuneration of 
those employed in the CBs, which in a different con-
text implied poor expectations for the development of 
the business in the short run.
Figure 12 is indicative of the core problems expe-
rienced by the CBs. Until 2008, financial and operat-
ing income (net) had steadily increased. This increase 
resulted from the lending activities, which were con-
sidered to be exceptionally lucrative and prospective. 
Real estate prices rose out of control, loans were repaid 
and everything seemed to support the positive expec-
tations of the moment. As always, a sobering trend oc-
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curred suddenly. The level of financial and operating 
income (net) over the following years was retained pri-
marily due to the high and floating interest rates on the 
loans, but the structure of their distribution changed 
substantially. According to the three main elements 
in Figure 12, administration costs and impairment 
almost froze up completely, but the other two were 
merged. Impairment and the ensuing provisions grew 
due to the irrecoverability of the loans and ate up in-
creasingly more of the remaining profit. 
 After four years the normalization sought in the 
income statement structures of the banking system 
had drifted substantiually. The structure of Figure 12 
would have been much more unfavorable for the CBs, 
if the old criteria for classification of risk exposure in 
the individual risk groups of „watch exposures”, „non-
performing exposures” and „loss” had been maintained 
(had they not been extended to twice as long in time 
instead). A hidden revolving door of bad debts was ob-
served (which statistics are unable to capture) in the 
hope that borrowers would manage to recover their 
business profitability in time. The CBs did not demon-
strate a desire to begin cashing the collateral pledged. 
Obviously, there were no acceptable conditions for that 
outcome.
For the overbuilt areas that consumed a  notably 
large amount of credit resources, the process runs 
slowly and sluggishly: investors are not prone to lower 
prices, and their expectations match the traditional 
beliefs that the market will not only pick up again 
but that it must pick up. The process extends in time 
together with the normalization of lending. Certain 
institutional changes have now restrained the specula-
tion in real estate, and moreover, the real estate market 
appears saturated at the moment. The other type of 
business that acts as a debtor to the CBs (and lies in 
the service sector primarily) suffers from the present 
crisis in consumer psychology. The latter can be stated 
somewhat in terms of “better be prepared for a poor 
tomorrow than to loosen one’s purse hoping for higher 
income in the future”.
Developments in the structure of the financial and 
operating income were also frozen (Figure 13). After 
2008, the CBs tried to maintain the level of interest 
income attained primarily through operation with the 
agreed floating interest rates on credits. An analogical 
effort to maintain the level of interest expenses was 
observed; in 2009, increased efforts were launched to 
attract deposits (Figure 10), but the effort put towards 
maintaining them outweighed them, however. 
Contradictory opinions exist with thespect to the 
CBs’ fee and commission income. According to the 
data, their size is also relatively stable, remaining 
within a fifth of the financial and operating income. 
An entirely different matter is that, given the situation, 
the fees and commissions have provided for the CBs’ 
profit (Figure 14), and they have become vital for the 
operation of the banking system. 
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Competition in the banking sector is functional 
as a whole and will not allow for an uncalculated 
transfer of CB difficulties to borrowers. Under the 
CBA, there are no mechanisms for directly influenc-
ing the CBs’ interest rate strategy and the creation 
of unilaterally beneficial conditions in the lending 
process. What is missing, however, is an adequate 
institutional structure for contractual relation-
ships between lenders and borrowers that might al-
low a certain level of arbitrariness on behalf of the 
CBs in changing the interest rates on contracts al-
ready signed. In Bulgaria, Hristov (2012) has been 
a  staunch champion of introducing an adequate 
institutional framework to fairly settle the relation-
ships between lenders and borrowers.
Policy lessons
There is an opinion in certain professional eco-
nomic circles that the financial and economic crisis 
of 2007-2008 arose because of excessive faith in the 
rationality of the market and that of the participants 
in the markets (Attali, 2008; Stiglitz, 2010b). Regula-
tions shrank steadily to allow for the free operation 
of market initiative and this initiative managed to 
create and spin a broad web of speculative threads, 
which were wound round and sucked out the eco-
nomic forces - in the interest of the “irrational” mar-
ket masters. These actions had their own redistribu-
tion effects, which went beyond the direct financial 
and economic operations. 
The main lesson should be aimed in the direction of 
making clear the type, nature and extent of necessary 
and adequate regulation. 
Regulation is achieved through: 
(1) Macroeconomic policies (monetary and fiscal);
(2) Build up of well functioning institutions. 
What occurred in the latest crisis confirms the opin-
ion that the banking system cannot be examined in 
isolation from the overall macroeconomic environ-
ment, i.e., by itself. The successful and adequate regu-
lation of the banking system exceeds the capacity of 
the central bank and is a function of the management 
of the financial and economic interaction at a na-
tional level. The coordinated and joint management 
of macroeconomic policies by the three institutions 
(the National Assembly, government and the cen-
tral bank) is of crucial importance for maintaining 
steady economic progress, which in turn is a major 
prerequisite for keeping the financial system sustain-
able. Managing processes by primarily taking into 
consideration the narrow establishment interests 
(e.g., the Ministry of Finance) might provide a par-
tial success in a given field but can create failures in 
other accompanying fields. At first sight, fiscal policy 
and imposition of sector priorities at a national level 
affect the redistribution process, but experience has 
shown that they can lead in parallel to restructuring 
of the financial resources with a direct impact on the 
40 
BULGARIAN BANKING: LOOKINK FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
 
40 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
01.08 01.09 01.10 01.11 01.12
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
Fee and Commissions Income (net) to CBs Profit Ratio 
(yearly)
Figure 14 
Figure 14. Fee and Commissions Income (net) to CBs Profit Ratio (yearly)Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
111 Bulgarian banking: looking for sustainability
sustainability of the banking system, quite often with 
consequences that can be difficult to foresee. 
Just prior to Bulgaria’s accession to the EU and 
during the first years of its membership, the inflow of 
foreign capital in the country recorded a considerable 
increase. The country adjusted exceedingly quickly to 
this capital meat-dish, and it appeared as if the horn of 
plenty would never be exhausted. Sobering trends, to-
gether with sharp contraction of the financial inflows 
have had a painful impact on financial and economic 
development. It is true that the financial crisis reflected 
most rapidly and significantly on the cross-border 
movement of capital, but it is also true that money 
does not shy away from an opportunity described by 
foresight, transparency, safety and profit. 
It is indicative that according to Transparency Inter-
national, Bulgaria has firmly held the position of the 
most corrupt country in the EU, and moreover, this 
situation has continued to worsen (Minassian, 2011). 
At its essence, corruption is a political not an economic 
problem, i.e., it exists because the political class can-
not (or does not want to) eradicate it. The black market 
has not been cornered and also has been steadily as-
sessed at a third or more of GDP. Shortsightedness in 
managing these developments undermines the basis of 
rational economic activities and puts off investors. The 
unassessed and complex consequences are connected 
with the shakeup of the banking system.
Macroeconomic policies enabled the expansion of 
the credit boom and its irrational nature. However, if 
one has to label the situation of 2007-2008, then the 
latter would be best described as an institutional crisis. 
Stiglitz (2010a) is one of the economists who carried 
out a detailed analysis of the role of the institutions in 
the current financial and economic crisis.
The poorly performing institutions enabled and 
made possible the direct investment in the financing 
of inefficient production structures. Misjudging the 
negative consequences from a disorderly maintained 
institutional environment is a form of irrationality, not 
of the immediate economic agents but of the acting 
players managing the economic political environment. 
The present government in Bulgaria is persistently 
pushing the idea that financial sustainability (under-
stood as an effort to balance the government budget) 
is a requirement and that economic prosperity on the 
way to converging on the core of developed econo-
mies in the EU is inevitable (automatic) in the future. 
Bareau proved that „...the convergence of the developed 
and less developed countries is not automatic but ... re-
quires an appropriate social and political infrastructure” 
(as cited in Gilpin, 2001).
The roots and grounds for such a policy must be 
sought in the principles followed by international fi-
nancial organizations (mainly the IMF) for interac-
tion with the individual countries. These policies are 
related to the material expression of the ideas of the 
so-called structural regulation formulated in the mid-
1980s by former Secretary of the Treasury of the USA 
G. Baker in connection with solving the debt problem 
on a global scale, and later (1989), with the recom-
mended ten types of reforms for the developing coun-
tries advocated by Williamson. These ideas have finally 
become known as the Washington Consensus (WaC) 
(Gilpin, 2001).
History has presented its evaluation of the sugges-
tions in the WaC, and it is by far unambiguous. Many 
analyses can be found in specialist literature of the ap-
plication of WaC. Aparticular critic of this approach 
is Stiglitz (2003), who said that „... the net effect of the 
policies set by Washington Consensus has all too often 
been to benefit the few at the expense of the poor, the 
well-off at the expense of the poor”. In their most recent 
Bulgarian edition of 2009-2012, the recommendations 
were glorified as defending market fundamentalism or 
neo-liberalism, and their name was formally replaced 
by the Maastricht criteria (MC) for the country’s acces-
sion to the Euro area. The treatment of both groups of 
principles (WaC and MC), however, has been one and 
the same: these poilicies must be paired with uncon-
ditional compliance as a guarantee for the respective 
countries’ future social and economic prosperity.
A similar policy can be defined as a type of neoclas-
sical caricature; Following it unflinchingly represents 
a demonstrative refusal to learn from the lessons of 
financial and economic history.
The WaC, on the one hand and MC, on the other are 
constructed with different initial conceptions and are 
aimed at formally different (and even incomparable) 
goals. What makes them comparable is the practice of 
treating them as absolute truths and pursuing them 
blindly. All secondary effects are ignored as well cer-
tain specific features for each given case, in the firm 
belief that there can only be positive consequences. 112 Garabed Minassian
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Both with the WaC and the MC, the positive effect 
of the policies recommended might take place given 
the obligatory assistance of adequately constructed 
and efficiently functioning public market institutions. 
A major issue of theoretical and practical importance 
is if and how far pursuing a policy of so-called financial 
stability (in the form of a balanced government bud-
get) is a real guarantee for attaining the final goal of the 
economy, i.e., steady rates of growth in the prosperity of 
the people. The most general (but not the only) measure 
of this final goal are the rates of GDP growth in combi-
nation with the accompanying indicators of all factors 
connected with overall human well-being.
Scientists have long worried about the problems of 
measuring and the measurements of economic prosper-
ity. In the early 2008, the president of the Republic of 
France, N. Sarkozy, appointed a special commission in 
response to „... increasing concerns about the adequacy 
of current measures of economic performance, in particu-
lar those based on GDP figures, and to broader concerns 
about the relevance of these figures as measures of societal 
well-being, as well as measures of economic, environmen-
tal and social sustainability” (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 
2010). The commission headed by Stiglitz involved 
other Nobel laureates in economics and outstanding 
representatives of social and economic thinking
„Too often we confuse ends with means”; this judg-
ment was made in the report of the special commis-
sion appointed by the President of the Republic of 
France, N. Sarkozy. The final goals of the economy are 
most generally the indicators for well-being and good 
quality of life, not individual indicators that we prefer 
to use as measurements of so-called called financial 
stability. It is a delusion to speak of financial stabil-
ity when there is no economic stability. Government 
expenditure is contracted, the deficit of the govern-
ment budget is under control, the international foreign 
exchange of the country is at an acceptable level, but 
what does this mean? The reduction in government 
expenditure as an end in itself cripples public activities 
of long-term impact (e.g., education, healthcare etc.) 
and the unfavorable consequences will be felt dread-
fully in the near future. For the sake of balancing the 
government budget, the government let itself delay the 
settlement of certain overdue large-scale obligations to 
sub-contractors of government orders, which in turn 
created prerequisites for a chain accumulation of inter-
company obligations and caused tension at a macro-
economic level (Sariyski, 2008; Taseva, 2012).
Central bankers claim that the Bulgarian taxpayer 
has not spent money to save the Bulgarian CBs, but 
this is a  surface observation. The highly restricted 
lending due to the excessively high interest rates is 
connected with the consistent and tangible shrink-
ing of all investment activities in the country, which 
sounds ominous in the long run given the exceptional 
technological backwardness of the Bulgarian economy. 
In addition, the highly restricted lending forced eco-
nomic players at the microeconomic level to activate 
commercial lending, which is a type of time bomb.
Additionally, it is not possible to speak of domestic 
financial sustainability when residents prefer to export 
their resources abroad.
What determines the health of an economy is the 
availability of economic sustainability, and the latter 
in turn determines social and economic prosperity. 
If there is no economic sustainability, everything else 
(including the so-called sustainability of government 
finances) is merely rhetorics.
Conclusion
The banking system is a  component of the financial 
and economic institutional structure of society, which 
is of crucial importance for the normal development 
of economic processes. Formally, the responsibility for 
keeping the banking system sustainable lies with the 
central bank, but as a matter of fact, the banking sys-
tem becomes the meeting point for almost all elements 
of macroeconomic management. An adequate assess-
ment of the banking system situation and its regulation 
presumes taking a view that is higher than banking co-
ordinates, from the position of the national (and the su-
pranational) economy. The sustainability of the banking 
system is functionally linked to and correlates with the 
sustainability of economic development. Problems in 
the banking system might arise from inadequate regula-
tory measures undertaken by the central bank, but in 
a prevailing number of cases, they are the outcome of 
deficiencies in macroeconomic management as a whole. 
The soundness of the banking system is linked to the 
value of transaction costs in the economy.
The financial and economic crisis that Bulgaria has 
experienced is the outcome of the domestic macro-
economic management of poor quality. Havrylchyk & Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Jurzyk (2011) found that direct evidence did not exist 
for the transfer of negative financial impacts from the 
parent bank to its subsidiary banks from Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Acharya &-Schnabl (2010) came 
to the conclusion that reducing global imbalances was 
not a panacea for preventing banking crises under the 
conditions of inefficient regulation. Investment bank-
ing was not developed in Bulgaria, and it cannot be 
blamed for the crisis. Even the shrinking external de-
mand cannot be named as an exogenous reason for the 
difficulties that the country has experienced. In 2011, 
for example, the export of goods and services exceeded 
its pre-crisis level of 2008 by a quarter, whereas the im-
ports of goods and services were almost a tenth lower, 
i.e., there are grounds to claim that in the critical situ-
ation, Bulgaria caused difficulties for its trade partners 
rather than the opposite. 
However, the globalization of developments, and of 
economic thinking most of all, reflects on the way in 
which domestic economic processes take place, and 
their manifestations follow the usual process of „con-
tamination” (Baur, 2012; Ismailescu & Kazemi, 2011; 
Wilczyński, 2011). It is a fact that the sharp withdrawal 
of foreign capital from Bulgaria coincided with the 
global recession and had a significant impact on the 
shrinking of national output, but such a reflection of 
financial and economic perturbations has occurred all 
over the world. If we trace the quotations of the Bul-
garian Brady bonds of the 90s in the last century as 
a barometer of investment interest towards the coun-
try, it becomes clear that they were influenced by glob-
al conjuncture, although Bulgaria did not participate 
in this specific process of crisis. A fall in investment 
interest in Bulgaria was witnessed during the Mexican 
debt crisis of 1994 (tequila effect), after the financial 
crisis in South-east Asia in 1997 and also (especially 
so) during the Russian financial crisis a year later. The 
effect of „contamination” in terms of the ebb in invest-
ment interest was impulsive, but the length of the re-
covery of the pre-crisis levels correlated positively with 
the efficiency of macroeconomic policy.
Financial and banking sustainability is an element 
of overall economic sustainability, which results pri-
marily from endogenous management policies. Eco-
nomic history has persistently confirmed that in the 
end „nothing is really exogenous” (Ray, 2004). The 
explanation of the financial and economic processes 
observed and the search for sustainability cannot take 
place except within the context of an integrated theory 
of finance and macroeconomics (Mehrling, 2004).
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